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Dispute Resolution at Games Time
Urvasi Naidoo* and Neil Sarin**1
INTRODUCTION
As the financial rewards in sport have become greater, questions of
control and discipline have become increasingly important. All
professional sports bodies have disciplinary codes governing the
conduct of their member athletes. They seek to impose even more
stringent controls over their members, but they run the risk of
litigation if procedures for control and discipline do not adhere to the
principles of procedural fairness.
In an international context it is interesting to examine how the
Olympic Movement deals with discipline and control, particularly at
Games time. Since the revival of the modern Games in 1896, the
Olympics has expanded and developed into a multi-billion-dollar
business responsible for the organisation of international competition
every two years. Summer and Winter Games combined involve
approximately 340 events and thirty-five International Sports
Federations. From this, we can see that the International Olympic
Committee (hereinafter “IOC”) is a pre-eminent international sports
body with immense political and economic power.
One
commentator, Anthony T. Polvino states:
The Olympic Movement, which is governed by the
International Olympic Committee, is the dominant
institution in the framework of international sports law.
The Olympic Movement performs two principal
functions: it plans association and competition among
* L.L.B., Wolverhampton University, England. L.L.M., Warwick University, England. A
solicitor from London, England; currently working with the Salt Lake Organizing
Committee for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002 in the Brand Protection team.
**B.A. University of Michigan 1989 (History), J.D., University of Iowa College of Law,
1993. An attorney, originally from Maryland; licensed to practise law in four States.
Currently working with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the Olympic Winter Games
of 2002 in the Brand Protection team.
1
The authors wish to express thanks to Lise Narbel, Secretary to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport.

VASI.FINAL

490

2/15/02 2:56 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

athletes and it ‘serves as a nucleus or catalyst for the
development of international sports law’ by making many
IOC rules and practices customary in the global system.2
The Olympic Movement uses contractual consensus to ensure that
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter “CAS”) settles all
disputes. How does this mandatory condition coincide, if at all, with
the imposition of legal norms of fairness and human rights? This
essay will attempt to answer this question with specific reference to
the Ad Hoc Division of CAS. We will look briefly at U.S. law, U.K.
law and European law. By way of example, we will consider a
specific case heard before the Ad Hoc Division in Nagano in 1998.
We conclude with some thoughts for the future, referring to the
recent creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency and a CAS
mediation process.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. How Do the CAS and the Ad Hoc Division Work?
The CAS was formed by the IOC in 1983 and became operational
in November 1984.3 It is a formal tribunal for the resolution of
sporting disputes.4
There are detailed codes to govern the
composition and formation of the CAS, its competence, function, the
applicable law, the composition of the arbitral panels and the
hearing and appeal processes.5 Its headquarters are in Lausanne,

2

See Anthony T. Polvino, Comment, Arbitration as Preventive Medicine for Olympic
Ailments: The International Olympic Committee’s Court of Arbitration for Sport and the
Future for the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347
(1994).
3
See Italy Spikes United States, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 23, 1994 (discussing the history of
the Court of Arbitration for Sport created in 1984 for final ruling in disputes between
athletes and sport federations).
4
See id.
5
To view a copy of the CAS Code for Sports Related Arbitration, see the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, at http://www.tas-cas.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
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Switzerland, and it now has two outposts in Denver, Colorado and
Sydney, Australia.6
B. How Does CAS Get its Jurisdiction?
The Olympic Movement is based on a pyramid structure:

IOC

INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS FEDERATIONS

NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEES

NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS / CLUBS AND ATHLETES

6

Mary K. Fitzgerald, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: Doping and Due Process During
the Olympics, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 213, 220 (2000).

VASI.FINAL

492

2/15/02 2:56 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

For organisations within this structure, the Olympic Charter is the
supreme authority.7 It sets out the guiding principles for all aspects
of the Olympic Movement.8 Rule 5 of the Fundamental Principles
proclaims, “Under the supreme authority of the IOC the Olympic
Movement encompasses [organisations], athletes and other persons
who agree to be guided by the Olympic Charter. The criterion for
belonging to the Olympic Movement is recognition by the IOC.”9
The power of the IOC is final and they must officially recognize
the International Federations (hereinafter “IFs”) and the National
Olympic Committees (hereinafter “NOCs”) before an individual
athlete can compete. In relation to IFs, Rule 29 confirms:
In order to be recognised these [organisations] must apply
the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code and conduct,
effective out-of-competition tests in accordance with the
established rules. . . . As far as the role of the IFs within
the Olympic Movement is concerned, their statutes,
practice and activities must be in conformity with the
Olympic Charter.10
Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter states, “Any dispute arising on the
occasion of, or in connection with, the Olympic Games shall be
submitted exclusively to the CAS, in accordance with the Code of
Sports Related Arbitration.”11
From this pyramid structure, we can see that the CAS gains its
jurisdiction primarily from Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter. In
7

See James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and
Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 491 n.6 (1992) (“The Olympic Charter is the codification of
the Fundamental Principles, Rules and Bye-laws adopted by the IOC. It governs the
organization and operation of the Olympic Movement and stipulates the conditions for the
celebration of the Olympic Games.”).
8
Id.
9
To view a full text of Rule 5 of Olympic Charter Fundamental Principles, see
http://multimedia.Olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
10
To view a full text of Rule 29 of Olympic Charter Fundamental Principles, see
http://multimedia.Olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
11
To view the Olympic Charter, see http://multimedia.Olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf
(last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
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addition, many of the IFs who are affiliated with the IOC will
provide in their bylaws and regulations that the CAS will have
jurisdiction in any arising disputes.12 At Games time athletes are
required to sign an entry form, which expressly gives the Ad Hoc
Division jurisdiction to arbitrate disputes arising during that period.13
There is thus a chain of contractual obligations, which binds the
athletes to observe the rules of the IOC Olympic Charter. Even if
there is no written contract, this contractual nexus may be implied or
inferred so that the IOC maintains supremacy.
CAS arbitrations are deemed to take place in Lausanne,
Switzerland, regardless of where they are actually held. They are
therefore governed by the CAS internal statute and codes and
ultimately by Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law
Act.14 Under the Swiss Laws, a challenge of a CAS award before the
Swiss Supreme Court would only succeed on limited grounds of
procedural impropriety or public policy.
Outside Switzerland, challenges to a CAS decision will be bound
by the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention.15
This has been ratified by 112 countries and provides for the

12

See Polvino, supra note 2, at 372:
Presently, fifteen important international federations have manifested their
confidence in the enforceability of CAS awards by introducing into their statutes
clauses providing for the recognition of the CAS as the sole judicial authority
competent to hear an appeal against the decisions of their internal bodies.
13
Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 238:
Beginning with the Atlanta Summer Games, athletes wishing to participate in
Olympic competitions were required to sign an arbitration agreement in their entry
forms, stating that they agreed to settle any disputes via CAS administered
arbitration. Specifically, the athletes agreed that ‘the decisions of the CAS [would]
be final, nonappealable, and enforceable.’
14
See Nafziger, supra note 7, at 507:
For choice-of-law purposes, party autonomy permits the selection of any
appropriate body of municipal law, general principles of law, the lex mercatoia,
other rules of arbitration, or international sports law. In the absence of specific
provision Swiss Law applies because of the location of CAS headquarters in
Lausanne.
15
See Polvino, supra note 2, at 373 (“Municipal courts generally will recognize and enforce
CAS awards, primarily under the New York Convention.”).
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international recognition of arbitration awards.16
Article V of this Convention sets out grounds for refusing to
recognise an arbitration award: 1) incapacity or invalidity of the
agreement; 2) improper notice; 3) the decision was beyond the scope
of the proceedings; 4) the arbitrator or proceedings were not in
accordance with the agreement; or 5) the award was set aside or
suspended by a competent authority. The award may also be
unenforceable under Article V if: 1) it is not valid according to the
laws of the State where its recognition and enforcement is sought; or
2) it is contrary to public policy.17
C. What Law Does CAS / Ad Hoc Division Apply?
The CAS Code states that disputes will be resolved according to
the law chosen by the parties or in the absence of agreement,
according to Swiss Law.18 However, for the Ad Hoc Division there
is no opportunity for choice and the arbitration is governed
ultimately by Chapter 12 of the Swiss Act on Private International
Law but pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations,
general principles of law and the rules of law deemed appropriate by
the Ad Hoc Division.19
Prior to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Division, disputes arising
at the Games were sent to the CAS for resolution, but no time scale
was imposed for deciding the cases and the CAS was still based in
Lausanne, Switzerland. Athletes may have been dissuaded from
pursuing their claims as the arbitration seemed so far removed from
the momentum of the Olympic Games.

16

Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 225 (“As of February of 2000, 112 countries had ratified the
Convention.”).
17
To view a full text of the New York Convention, see International Alternative Dispute
Resolution, at http://www.internationaladr.com/tc121.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
18
See Rule 45 CAS Code of Arbitration for Sports Disputes.
19
See Rules 7 and 17 of the Ad Hoc Division rules for Sydney.
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Following the long and protracted case involving Butch
Reynolds,20 the IOC, in an attempt to ward off future court cases,
introduced a new procedure for the settlement of disputes arising
during Games time. This was brought into operation for the Atlanta
Games in 1996, was used again in Nagano in 1998 and in Sydney in
2000. In May 1996, the International Council for the Arbitration for
Sport presented the new “Rules for the Resolution of Disputes
arising during the Olympic Games,” which set out the procedure for
swiftly resolving disputes at Games time.21
It was anticipated that the panel of arbitrators would be available
immediately and make its decision within twenty-four hours of an
application being filed. The procedure would be free of charge. In
most cases the panel’s decision was to be final, in some complex or
technical matters where a decision could not be made straight away
the case would be referred to the CAS for regular arbitration.
The press release for the new process did not mention that athletes
would have to sign, in their entry form, an agreement to settle all
disputes by way of such arbitration. At the time of the Ad Hoc
Division introduction, many athletes voiced concern at signing an
agreement to binding arbitration. However, the IFs of all the
Olympic Sports were persuaded to agree to the process thereby
ensuring that if athletes did not sign the contract/entry form, then
they would be excluded from the competition.
D. What Legal Norms Should Apply to the Resolution of Sports
Disputes?
In the U.S., the Constitution guarantees rights of due process
through the Fifth Amendment and applies these to the states through
20

Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). For a more
complete discussion of the case, see David Mack, Reynolds v. IAAF: The Need for an
Independent Tribunal in International Athletic Disputes, CONN. J. INT’L L. (1995).
21
See International Olympic Committee, at http://www.olympic.org (last visited Jan. 23,
2002). The Olympic Division is an international arbitration court. Id. It is independent and
follows court-like procedures granting due process. Id. It will be present on site throughout
the Games, available around the clock. Id.

VASI.FINAL

496

2/15/02 2:56 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

the Fourteenth Amendment.22 These rights arise where a state action
infringes upon a life, liberty or property interest.23 Organisations
deemed to be performing a public function or authorised under the
laws of the state (quasi-public institutions) are also viewed as state
actors.24
Each case is taken on its own merits, but generally an athlete will
have a property interest because there is a potential economic benefit
in his continued participation in his sport.25 If he has such a property
interest, then he is entitled to due process rights. The current
Olympic athlete has more financial support at stake than ever before.
Athletes can receive financial support through their National
Olympic Committee (hereinafter “NOC”) and National Governing
Board (hereinafter “NGB”).26 In addition to financial support,
different governing bodies institute incentives and bonuses for
obtaining medals during the Games, like “Program Gold” which was

22

U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV.
See Stephen Schilde Williams, Comment, Can a Louisiana Unit Order Be Effective
Retroactively?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1133 n.95 (1989) (explaining the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ prohibitions on any state action impeding on an individual’s right to life,
liberty, or property without due process of the law).
24
See 15 AM. JUR. 2d, Civil Rights § 83 (2000) (describing the factors courts look at when
determining whether a quasi-public institution is a state actor for Constitutional purposes).
25
See Brian L. Porto, Balancing Due Process and Academic Integrity in Intercollegiate
Athletics: The Scholarship Athlete’s Limited Property Interest in Eligibility, 62 IND. L.J.
1151, 1159 (1987) (explaining in the context of a collegiate athlete the athlete’s economic
interest in uninterrupted preparation in order to so enter the lucrative career as a profession
athlete).
26
See To City and Sports Desks: Fundraising to Begin for Olympic Training, PR
NEWSWIRE (Sept. 18, 1985) (“U.S. Olympic athletes, unlike those from all other countries,
do not receive any continuing financial support from their government. The USOC is the
only one of the 161 national Olympic committees in the world that finances all training,
medical supervision, and transportation for its athletes.”); see also Eric Moses, Q&A:
Restoring the Shine: IOC’s Highest-Ranking American Talks About How Scandal Has
Changed the Olympics, and What People Should Really be Talking About, DAILY NEWS
(L.A.) (Mar. 7, 1999) (noting that the International Olympic Committee also provides
financial support for athletes’ training).
23
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in effect in Atlanta.27 It is the taking of this property interest that
triggers the due process analysis.
Due process rights are split into two: procedural due process and
substantive due process. Procedural due process evolved from the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge,28 which
stated that procedural due process provides a party “the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”29 In
terms of procedural due process, an athlete would be entitled to a
hearing and notice of the hearing time, date and content. The level
of these rights will depend upon the rights affected by the decision.
For the gravest situations the maximum protection would involve the
right to a hearing in front of a neutral decision-maker with an
opportunity to make an oral presentation, to present favourable
evidence and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
There may also be a right to have an attorney present; to receive a
copy of the transcript and to have a written decision based on the
record.
Substantive due process focuses on whether the rule, regulation or
legislation being violated is fair and reasonable and clearly relevant
to the accomplishment of its purpose. Purely private rather than
governmental decisions are not subject to constitutional due process
requirements but over the years the U.S. has developed case law,
which will ensure that a minimum standard of due process is applied
in private situations. Berry and Wong set out five conditions where
generally the courts will review the rules of sports bodies: 1) the
rules violate public policy because they are fraudulent or
unreasonable; 2) the rules exceed the scope of the association’s
authority; 3) the organization violates one of its own rules; 4) the

27

See Melissa Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the Process
Better or Worse for “Job Security”?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 665 (1998) (“Couple the
grants with prize money, throw in commercial endorsements and appearance fees and top
off the package by paying various coaching and training expenses, and an Olympic athlete
may well have their entire livelihood dependent upon competing in their sport.”). Id. at 666.
28
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
29
Id. at 333.
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rules are applied unreasonably or arbitrarily; or 5) the rules violate an
individual’s constitutional rights.30
Principles of natural justice and human justice demand that a
sporting organisation observe these tenets of natural justice. In
particular, there is an implied duty to act fairly, to allow the athlete
to make representations against the charges and to ensure that the
panel deciding the case is not biased.
The U.K., unlike the U.S., does not have a constitution affording
specific rights of due process. Rights may be implied in contract or
may be based on common law. The U.K. courts have been willing to
intervene in the interests of natural justice in some cases, and in
others they have not been willing to do so, as the national and
international governing bodies of sport are private bodies and are
therefore entitled to make their own rules, which are bound in
contract rather than public law. The crucial recurring question in the
case law is whether the legal relationship between athletes and
governing bodies is governed by private law or public law. The
question is crucial because it determines on what basis an athlete can
challenge a governing body’s decision and what the legal remedies
may be.
The following brief examination of some U.K. cases illustrates that
where there is an issue of public policy or procedural fairness, the
courts may intervene, but in all other cases, they will defer discipline
and control to the governing bodies of the sport. The courts have
decided that governing bodies are regulated mainly by private law,
and therefore will not be able to invoke public law remedies such as
judicial review.

30

See BERRY & WONG, 2 LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 36 (1984).
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II. CASE LAW
A. Wright v. The Jockey Club31
The plaintiff was a professional jockey. The defendant refused to
grant him a license on medical grounds. The plaintiff sought
damages for loss of earnings, arguing that the defendant had
breached its duty of care in carrying out its licensing functions. The
claim was dismissed. The court held that the defendant was a
domestic tribunal, and the only term implied by law was a duty to act
fairly. They confirmed that this aspect of fairness involved a number
of aspects: “First that the Committee should act in good faith. . . .
Secondly fairness involved informing the plaintiff of the nature of
the material or grounds on which the application might be refused
and thirdly giving him the opportunity to answer those matters.”
On the facts of this particular case, the court found that the
defendant had not acted unfairly.
B. Jones v. Welsh Rugby Union32
The plaintiff was a rugby union player sent off for fighting during
a game. He was suspended for four weeks by Welsh Rugby Union’s
disciplinary committee pending appeal. He had not been given the
opportunity to make representations at the disciplinary hearing. The
committee had viewed a video in private. The plaintiff had not been
able to comment on the video evidence, or to present his own
evidence and questions. The court held that this was a procedural
defect, which had rendered the proceedings unfair. They granted an
injunction lifting the suspension and allowing the plaintiff to play
pending the hearing of an appeal against the committee’s decision.

31
32

Jockey Club Licensing Comm. ex parte Wright (Q.B. 1991).
Times Mar. 1997 (Q.B. 1997); Times Jan. 1998 (C.A. 1998).
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C. Currie v. Barton33
An amateur tennis player sought to have a ban
preventing him from playing for the county overturned
because he had not been present at the hearing at which
the ban had been imposed. The application was dismissed
as the court held that the County Tennis Association was
an unincorporated association and the plaintiff did not have
a contractual relationship with it.
D. Gasser v. Stinson34
The plaintiff was an amateur athlete who was suspended for two
years from competitions held under rules of the International
Amateur Athletics Federation (hereinafter “IAAF”) for testing
positive for drugs. She claimed the test was not in accordance with
IAAF rules, and that the rules relating to bans amounted to
unreasonable restraint of trade. The court held that the rules were
not unreasonable, and that the plaintiff was bound by the result of the
drugs test and the IAAF rules.
E. Wilander v. Tobin35
The plaintiffs were international tennis players who faced
disciplinary proceedings on the charge of having taken banned drugs.
They brought proceedings alleging that the disciplinary proceedings
were void as being an unreasonable restraint of trade as they had no
right to be heard or adduce evidence in their defence until the appeal
hearing. The court rejected the argument that the disciplinary
proceedings were void in unreasonable restraint of trade.

33

Times Feb. 1988 (C.A. 1988).
Unreported decision, 1998.
35
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 195 (Ch. D. 1996); aff’d, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 293 (C.A. 1997).
34
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F. Edwards v. British Athletic Federation36
The plaintiff was an athlete who had been banned for four years
after testing positive for anabolic steroids. The IAAF later refused to
remit the last two years of his ban. He claimed this was
discriminatory under European Community Law, as remission had
been granted to athletes from other European Economic Area
(hereinafter “EEA”) countries where their domestic laws limited
bans to two years. The court held that rules relating to drug control
rules in sport are not subject to Community Law, as they are
exclusively sporting rules.
G. Modahl v. British Athletic Federation, Ltd. (hereinafter “BAF”)37
Modahl is probably the most famous case in the U.K. relating to a
positive drug test. Modahl was suspended after a positive drug test.
At her first disciplinary hearing, the suspension was upheld, but later
an appeal panel allowed her appeal.
She then commenced
proceedings for damages alleging that the disciplinary committee had
not acted in a bona fide manner, and had been biased against her.
In lengthy and protracted litigation, the case was finally decided in
the Queen’s Bench Division in December 2000. The court found
that because there was no contract between the claimant, Modahl,
and the defendant, BAF, there was no basis upon which she could
argue that there was an implied term that disciplinary proceedings
against her would be conducted fairly. However, upon considering
the facts of the case the court found that the allegations of bias were
unfounded, and that the BAF had acted impartially.

36
37

2 C.M.L.R. 363 (Ch. D. 1997).
2000 WL 33201389 (Q.B. 2000), aff’d, 2001 WL 1135166 (C.A. 2001).

VASI.FINAL

502

2/15/02 2:56 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

III. DOES THE CAS / AD HOC DIVISION MEET THESE LEGAL NORMS?
A. The Rule against Bias
From its inception, the CAS was seen as an IOC tool, and its
impartiality was always under question. This was discussed in the
case of Gundel v. International Equestrian Federation (FEI)38 in
1993, which confirmed that the CAS was an arbitral court with the
ability to pronounce final and enforceable awards, and that recourse
to the Swiss courts would be on very narrow issues of procedural
impropriety or misdirection in law. While finding in principle that
CAS decisions could not be challenged, the Court expressed
concerns that the CAS was a creation of the IOC, that the IOC had
the power to choose CAS members, and that the CAS did not have
separate legal and financial personality.39
Responding to these criticisms, the CAS underwent several
reforms to attain independence from the IOC.40 In June 1994, the
International Council Of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter “ICAS”)
was founded.41 The ICAS’s function is to safeguard the arbitration
process and the financial independence of the CAS.42 It therefore
oversees all the administration and financing of the CAS and ensures
its autonomy.43
An important change was that the power to select Arbitrators and
the Panel was taken from the IOC and placed with the ICAS. CAS
38

Gundel v. FEI/CAS I Civil Court, ATF 15th March 1993.
For a more detailed discussion of Gundel, see Jan Paulsson, Arbitration of International
Sports Disputes, 9 ARB. INT’L 359 (1993).
40
Stephen A. Kaufman, Issues in International Sports Arbitration, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 527
(1995):
In response to continuing criticisms regarding the CAS’s lack of independence, the
IOC and the thirty-two international federations it oversees, agreed to establish the
ICAS on June 22, 1994 . . . the ICAS’s primary duties include ensuring the absolute
independence of the CAS from the IOC, and protecting the rights of the parties
appearing before the CAS.
41
Id.
42
See id.
43
Id. (“[T]he ICAS completely manages and administers the finances of the CAS, which
includes approving the budget and annual accounts.”).
39
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Arbitrators are now chosen by the IOC, IFs, NOCs and by the ICAS
from independent individuals.44 Selections are made in accordance
with Sections 13 to 19 of the Code.45
B. The Rule for Fairness
With these reforms the CAS has improved its credibility, but with
regards to the Ad Hoc Division, the main issue is the fairness of the
imposition of a mandatory arbitration clause for Olympic Athletes.
As Bitting explains:
For many Olympic caliber athletes, training and
competing in their chosen sport is their job—their means
of supporting themselves and their families. As a result,
any contract agreement between the athlete/employee and
governing officials/employer should be subject to standard
contract analysis.46
In contract law, a contract may be void, voidable or unenforceable
for various reasons. In relation to the Ad Hoc Division, let us
consider some of the key issues:
1. Unequal Bargaining Power47—an athlete has no choice
but to sign. For many athletes, competing in the Olympics
is their highest goal. They train endlessly to be selected
and to be afforded the opportunity to compete. The
44

Id.:
The ICAS selects the arbitrators as follows: 20 arbitrators proposed by the IOC, 20
arbitrators proposed by the IFs, 20 arbitrators proposed by the NOCs, 20 arbitrators
chosen after appropriate consultations with a view to safeguarding the interests of the
athletes, [and] 20 arbitrators chosen from among persons independent of the bodies
responsible for proposing arbitrators in conformity with the present article.
45
For a more detailed discussion about the composition of the CAS, see Jose Marxuach, The
Court of Arbitration for Sport, WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REPORT (March 1999).
46
Bitting, supra note 27, at 664.
47
See Daniel Gides, Comment, Judicial Postponement of Death Recognition: The Tragic
Case of Mary O’Connor, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 318 n.112 (1989) (noting that courts
have often been willing to void contracts under concepts such as unequal bargaining power
and public policy).
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tournament is only held every four years, and in some
cases if an athlete misses the Games, they may pass their
peak in the intervening four-year period. With all these
pressures, an athlete signs the entry form. If they do not
sign then they simply cannot become an Olympian.
2. Clause Violates Public Policy48—does it invoke notions
of morality and justice? In English law, any contractual
attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts would be
unconstitutional and void for public policy grounds. A
body may refer a case for arbitration, but they cannot
prevent court access that can only be done through statute.
The athlete entry form for the Sydney Games contains a
clause waiving the right to litigate. Would a domestic
court uphold this?
3. Unconscionability49—Does the clause unfairly favour
the organisation imposing the agreement, and is there an
absence of meaningful choice for the athlete?
4. Undue Influence/Adhesion50—Was the standard
contract drafted and imposed by the party holding the
superior bargaining power? In English law the principle
“contra proferentum” will apply, whereby if there is any
ambiguity in the contract, a court will hold that the
contract benefits the athlete rather than the IOC.
48

See id.
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(holding a contract should be unenforceable if any element is unconscionable when the
contract is formed and defining unconscionability as including an absence of a meaningful
choice on the part of one party where the contract terms are favourable to the other party);
see also UCC § 2-302 (declaring that a court may refuse to enforce a contract which it finds
to be unconscionable when made).
50
See generally CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS
IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 634 (4th ed.) (“In essence undue influence
involves the use of excessive pressure to persuade one vulnerable to such pressure, pressure
applied by a dominant subject to a servient object.”).
49
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5. Duress51—has there been an imposition of improper
pressure or threat to the athlete, so that they have no
choice but to sign the agreement?
6. Capacity52—Many of the athletes competing are under
eighteen. Are they able to enter into a valid contract
signing away their litigation rights?
7. Restraint of Trade53—Can the Ad Hoc Division rule to
have binding mandatory arbitration be viewed as an
unreasonable restraint of trade, and therefore contrary to
public policy and voidable? The common law doctrine of
restraint of trade in U.K. law has intervened in cases to
protect an individual against an unreasonable restraint of
trade upon their right to work even though they may have
bargained that right away. Can that same doctrine work to
protect an athlete’s right to compete, if indeed such a right
exists?
Each case will be considered on its own facts, but from this brief
note we can see that sports bodies would also be bound by the legal
norms of contract law and common law. Many of the issues above
could be raised in a claim against the Ad Hoc Division. Perhaps the
strongest claim would be one which argues the doctrine of restraint
of trade. In the U.K., case law has established that individual
51

Id. at 632 (“Duress consists of unlawful confinement of another’s person, or relatives, or
property, which causes him to consent to transaction through fear.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the
contract is voidable by the victim.”).
52
There is a general rule that minors do not have the capacity to enter into contracts. See
generally Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1992) (describing the common law
“infancy doctrine,” which was enacted to protect minors from contracts entered into based
on their lack of judgment).
53
See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1985) (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry,
204 Ga. 794, 802 (1949) (“While it is the general rule that a contract in general restraint of
trade is void, a contract only in partial restraint may be upheld.”)).
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athletes may challenge the rules of a governing body even though
there may be no contractual relationship.54
It has also been established that an athlete need not be a
professional to bring a restraint of trade claim.55 The most difficult
aspect of such a restraint of trade claim would be to successfully
establish that the rules were unreasonable. The IOC would counter
argue that such rules are necessary for the expedient and efficient
resolution of disputes, and that in the interests of their sports event,
they are necessary and reasonable. They may also state that their
rules are purely sporting and do not affect the trade or employment
of athletes.
U.S. courts have recognised “arbitration is simply a matter of
contract between the parties.”56 “When the parties agree to have
disputes settled by an arbitrator, they also agree to accept the
arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract.”57
However, an arbitrator is still bound by due process, and an
arbitration award can be vacated where the losing party was “not
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”58 To meet this due
process standard, the arbitrator must hold a fundamentally fair
hearing, which is described as “one that meets the minimal
requirements of fairness—adequate notice, a hearing of the evidence
and an impartial decision by the arbitrator.”59 It is important to note
the “minimal requirement” is merely a floor below which the due
process rights of the parties must not fall. The focus of American
jurisprudence in analysing arbitration is that it is voluntary, and it is
thus a choice made by the parties during arm’s length negotiations.
This runs counter to the experience of the Olympic athlete who, in
order to participate, must sign an agreement to arbitrate any dispute
and be bound by the result. This is not a choice without
consequence, as Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit recently wrote,
54

See Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 574 (Ch. D. 1963); Greig
v. Insole, 1 W.L.R. 302 (Ch. D. 1978).
55
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
56
See, e.g., Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1129 (7th Cir.
1997) (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)).
57
Generica, 125 F.3d at 1129.
58
Id. at 1130.
59
Id.
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A party’s choice to accept arbitration entails a trade-off.
A party can gain a quicker, less structured way of
resolving disputes; and it may also gain the benefit of
submitting its quarrels to a specialized arbiter. . . . Parties
lose something, too: the right to seek redress from the
courts for all but the most exceptional errors at
arbitration.60
Parties attempting to resolve their disputes through arbitration
“should not expect the same procedures they would find in the
judicial arena.”61 This includes the fact that arbitrators are not bound
by the rules of evidence.62
The U.S. courts will likely defer to the choice to arbitrate any
claims. The courts have been willing to defer to the Amateur Sports
Act,63 which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the USOC over all
matters pertaining to the United States participation in the Olympic
Games. Ultimately, decisions of eligibility fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the USOC. As Judge Posner recently opined, “there
can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for
determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the
eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.”64
Clearly the U.S. courts will defer to the USOC for eligibility
decisions, and will only become involved where grave due process
violations occur.
C. European Law
Article 7 of the European Anti-Doping Convention of 1989
provides that there should be a clear and enforceable provision to
appeal any judgement made, and that appeal should be heard with

60

Dean v. Sullivan, 118 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 1997).
Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 592 (7th Cir. 2001).
62
Generica, 125 F.3d at 1130.
63
36 U.S.C. § 380 (2001).
64
Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (Ill. 1984) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
61
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regard to the principles of natural justice.65
Decisions of the Ad Hoc Division are final and binding. In the
case of Wilander v. Tobin66 the court considered the application of
Article 7 in relation to appeals. Justice Lightman stated:
This (as it seems to me) means that the suspected
sportsman is entitled to two hearings, namely a hearing at
first instance and a hearing on appeal from an adverse
decision at first instance. . . . In the light of the terms of
the 1989 Convention and the recognition of this
fundamental right, I think that there is a serious question
whether a disciplinary procedure such as r53, making no
provision for an appeal, is materially deficient and unfair
and whether r53 is accordingly, on this ground, in
unreasonable restraint of trade.67
Although this was overturned by the court of appeals, in European
law, an athlete could formulate similar arguments and bring a claim
against the mandatory binding arbitration of the Ad Hoc Division, as
it clearly imposes that its awards are final and cannot be challenged.
In the U.K., the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on
October 2, 2000.68 This Act takes the principal rights contained in
the European Convention on Human Rights and sets them up as a
screen through which all domestic legislation and acts of public
authorities must be viewed. It is a constitutional development, which
affords to U.K. citizens the protections of the European Convention
on Human Rights.69 It means that if a dispute arises, the U.K.
national may bring a claim in the domestic courts rather than having
to take a claim to the European Court of Human Rights. In the
65

For full text of the European Anti-Doping Convention of 1989, see Anti-doping
Convention, at http://culture.coe.fr/Infocentre/txt/eng/econ135.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2002).
66
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 195 (Ch. D. 1996); aff’d, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 293 (C.A. 1997).
67
Id.
68
Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1244 n.4 (“The Human Rights Act became effective in England
on October 2, 2000, and adopted the European Code of Human Rights as domestic law.”).
69
Id.
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context of this discussion, we are concerned with Article 6, which
grants the right to a fair trial. Article 6 essentially provides that in
determining a person’s civil rights, everyone is entitled to a fair,
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent impartial
tribunal.70
This was intended specifically for criminal trials, but it also
extends to any dispute that concerns civil rights and obligations. The
Convention Rights may apply to sports governing bodies if they are
acting as public authorities, or if their decisions are such that they
affect the rights of individuals to engage in commercial activity. In
any event, as Lloyd states, “[t]he Courts are likely to consider the
Convention rights set out in Article 6 as yardsticks of fair conduct by
a disciplinary tribunal in the same way as they have taken into
account the rules of natural justice.”71
Under European Law, the Treaty of Rome affords fundamental
rights,72 which are relevant in international sports law. These
include: Article 39 (previously 48), freedom of movement for
workers; Articles 43 and 49 (previously 52 and 59), freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services for workers; and
Articles 81 and 82 (previously 85 and 86), competition—prohibition
of practices, which prevent, restrict or distort competition and
prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position.73
These Treaty rights will apply to the practice of sport if it
constitutes an economic activity within the EEA. The rules of
governing bodies will not be subject to Treaty rights if they are not
70
To view the full text of the European Convention on Human Rights, see the European
Court of Human Rights, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/BasicTexts.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2002).
71
See Lloyd, Sports Disciplinary Proceedings and the Human Rights Act, 8 SPORT & THE
L.J. 61 (2000).
72
See Youri Devuyst, The European Union’s Constitutional Order? Between Community
Method and Ad Hoc Compromise, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 47 (2000) (noting that
although the Treaty of Rome did not explicitly confer fundamental rights, the Court in
Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, “stated unambiguously that such rights
formed an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance it protect.”).
73
To view the full text of the Treaty of Rome, see http://www.cerebalaw.com/rome.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
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economic, and are merely of sporting interest. The courts will
intervene to put a stop to restrictive practices that have a significant
economic impact and that cannot be justified as a rule inherent in the
sport or a rule necessary for the organisation of sport or sporting
competitions.74
A decision of the Ad Hoc Division may have an adverse economic
impact on the professional career or livelihood of an athlete. The
athlete may lose the ability to enter into lucrative sponsorship and
endorsement contracts or worse, have existing contracts terminated
for breach. Following previous European case law, this factor would
mean that such a claim would be actionable.
European law may therefore be used in an action claiming that an
athlete should not be bound by binding mandatory arbitration, as it
breaches the athlete’s Treaty rights. While the IOC is definitely in a
dominant position, it may be difficult to show that the clause
imposing the Ad Hoc Division arbitration infringes competition
rules, and has the effect of distorting or restricting interstate trade
competition. Arguments alleging breach of competition rights have
been made in previous sports cases, but European courts have not
made any conclusive pronouncements to confirm that the Treaty
rights will apply in sporting situations to individual athletes.75 It may
therefore be more appropriate for an athlete to rely on arguments
claiming restraint of trade and subsequent breach of Articles 43 and
49.
IV. AUSTRALIAN CASE
No Ad Hoc Division has been challenged in a domestic court, but
a recent claim to the Australian domestic courts found that the
arbitration agreement signed by the athlete had a valid exclusion
clause (waiver of athletes right to litigate), and therefore the
74
See Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch v. Union Cycliste Int’l, 1974 E.C.R. 1405; Case 13/76,
Dona v. Montero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333; Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de
Football Ass’n v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921; Case C-51/96, Deliege v. Ligue
Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees, 2000 E.C.R. I-2549.
75
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921.
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supreme court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
The contract read in part that the seat of arbitration is
Lausanne, Switzerland and that the hearing will take place
in Sydney. The unqualified choice of Lausanne as the
seat of all CAS arbitration within the scope of the
arbitration agreement meant that the agreement did
provide for arbitration in a country other than Australia.
Accordingly this was not a domestic arbitration agreement
and an appeal of the CAS award could not be made to an
Australian court of law.76
This case merely reaffirms the principles of the New York
Convention, and that the basis for a successful challenge of a CAS
award has to be some procedural impropriety or some issue of public
policy.
In the U.S., the recent case of Mary Decker Slaney also confirmed
that in accordance with the New York Convention, a domestic court
will not relitigate issues decided by arbitration unless there is a valid
defence under the Convention that bars enforcement of the award.
The case further held that if an athlete wishes to claim they did not
agree to arbitration, or they were not a party to the arbitration, then
such claim needs to be made before the arbitration hearing.77
This would be an important point to bear in mind if an athlete
wished to bring a claim against a decision of the Ad Hoc Division.
An athlete may be able to counter this by arguing that due to the
urgency and time constraints involved in an Olympic dispute, it was
76

See A Challenge to the Olympics Case Decided by CAS, WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REPORT (Nov. 2000).
77
In Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2001), the court
noted:
Our judicial system is not meant to provide a second bite at the apple for those who
have sought adjudication of their disputes in other forums and are not content with the
resolution they have received. Slaney had the opportunity to show that she had never
agreed to arbitrate the dispute when she was notified of the arbitration, but she let that
opportunity pass. Slaney could not sit back and allow the arbitration to go forward,
and only after it was done . . . say: oh by the way we never agreed to the arbitration
clause.
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virtually impossible to have pursued a court hearing before the Ad
Hoc Division hearing. As we have remarked above, in Olympic
disputes speed is of the essence.
The approach of the IOC has been to ensure that the CAS is the
only body involved in resolving sports disputes at the Olympics.
Juan Antonio Samaranch stated:
I am certain that the aim is for sports bodies to keep
control over the organization and holding of contests and
therefore over the settlement of disputes concerning the
practice of sport, primarily because the application of
game rules and disciplinary regulations is by and large
bound to be beyond an ordinary judge.78
Although it is not a governmental body, the IOC wields such
international power that any allegations of injustice on public policy
grounds would be difficult. However, a claim using contract law
may succeed on the basis that the athlete has no choice and therefore
has unequal bargaining power, and/or that the clause imposing
binding mandatory arbitration is in restraint of trade.
In Atlanta, 197 nations competed in 271 events with a total of
10,744 athletes. Six cases were submitted to the Ad Hoc Division,
two of which were consolidated. In Nagano, eighty nations
competed in sixty-eight events with 2,302 athletes, but only five
cases were submitted to the Ad Hoc Division, two were consolidated,
so only four cases were heard. A closer study of one of these cases
appears below. In Sydney, fifteen cases were brought, but one was
withdrawn shortly before the hearing, so fourteen cases were heard.
To date there have been no court cases against the awards of the Ad
Hoc Division.

78

See Kaufman, supra note 40, at 549; see also Juan Antonio Samaranch, Opening Speech
by the President of the IOC at the International Conference on Law and Sport, Sept. 13-14,
1993, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND SPORT 141 (1993).
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V. NAGANO CASE STUDY
Snowboarding was first introduced as an Olympic Sport in Nagano
in 1998. On Sunday February 8, 1998, Canadian snowboarder Ross
Rebagliati won the Gold Medal in the Men’s Giant Slalom. On the
morning of February 11, 1998, the IOC Executive Board upon
recommendation of the IOC Medical Commission voted to disqualify
Rebagliati after he tested positive for marijuana.79
The Canadian Olympic Association (hereinafter “COA”) appealed
on Rebagliati’s behalf to the Ad Hoc Division.80 Rebagliati argued
that the last time he had used marijuana was in April of 1997, but
that he spends a significant amount of time in an environment with
marijuana users, and believed he had inhaled second-hand marijuana
smoke.81 In particular, he attended a going-away party in his
hometown on January 20 and 31, shortly before travelling to Nagano
for the Games.
The COA prepared a defence on this basis, gathering data on
second-hand marijuana smoke and its effects, and the level of the
drug that might feasibly show up in a urine specimen following such
secondary inhalation. Medical Advisers confirmed that the smoking
of a marijuana cigarette would result in a concentration of
approximately 400 nanograms per millilitre in a urine sample.
Rebagliati’s sample only had a concentration of 17.8, but the
International Ski Federation (hereinafter “FIS”) regulations stated
action should be taken against any athlete with a concentration above
15.82
All these arguments were unnecessary, as it turned out that on a
technicality the IOC had no power to disqualify Rebagliati anyway!
Under the IOC’s Medical Code, a sanction can only be imposed on

79

See The Mountain Zone, Olympics ’98, Rebagliati Wins Back His Gold, Feb. 12,
1998 (reporting the events surrounding the Rebagliati controversy), at
http://classic.mountainzone.com/olympics/nagano/up2-12a.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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an athlete if there is an agreement between the respective sports
federation and the IOC to test for marijuana.83
The sports federation in this instance was FIS, and they had no
agreement with the IOC to ban marijuana use for competitors. FIS
gave evidence to the Ad Hoc Division that it did not request doping
control officers to test for marijuana and that it had not specifically,
in its rules, forbidden the use of marijuana.
On the evening of February 11, 1998, the Ad Hoc Division issued
its decision, which quashed the IOC disqualification ruling. They
found that the IOC had no legal authority to strip the medal, as there
was no agreement between them and FIS to ban marijuana. The
decision was final and binding on all parties, and Rebagliati was told
that he would face no further sanctions or penalties whatsoever for
testing positive for marijuana. He was completely exonerated by the
decision, and his medal and good name were restored.84
Following this decision, the IOC Medical Commission amended
the Anti-Doping Code so that testing for marijuana will be conducted
at the Olympic Games regardless of IF consent.
CONCLUSION
The quick resolution of disputes at Games time is crucial. The Ad
Hoc Division of CAS is a perfect medium through which to achieve
this. As we have seen in the case of Rebagliati, the process of appeal
was dealt with rapidly, efficiently and it produced a favourable result
for the athlete. Lawyers Kaufmann-Kohler85 and Beloff86 have both
written of the speed, efficiency and impartiality of the Ad Hoc

83
Ch. 11, Art. III, ¶ B of the IOC Medical Code, as in force February 1998 (“In agreement
with the International Sports Federations and responsible authorities tests may be conducted
for cannabinoids (marijuana hashish). The results may lead to sanctions.”).
84
CAS OG 98/002, reported in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 (M. Reeb ed.).
85
See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration and the Games—Or The First Experience of
the Olympic Division of the CAS, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REPORTS (Feb. 1997).
86
See Michael Beloff, The Court of Arbitration for Sport at the Olympics, SPORTS & L.J. OF
THE BRITISH ASS’N FOR SPORT & THE LAW (1998).
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Division, but they are both members of the CAS who have sat on Ad
Hoc Division panels.
While to date there have been no challenges to an Ad Hoc
Division decision, it would be interesting to see how a domestic
court would react to an athlete’s claims of public policy, unequal
bargaining power and restraint of trade as we have discussed above.
These appeals are always controversial, and there is always a huge
stake involved for the athlete. Consequently, questions regarding the
impartiality and independence of the CAS continue to arise. Despite
this, the Ad Hoc Division does have several key factors in its favour:
1) it is more neutral than arbitration by the governing bodies of sport;
2) the composition of the panel makes it better qualified in the
subject area than the state judiciary; 3) there is speedy resolution—
litigation is lengthy; 4) there is no cost involved—litigation is
expensive; 5) confidentiality; 6) there is some flexibility in
proceedings, not bound by rigid court rules of procedure and
evidence; 7) a court judgement, even though favourable, may be
difficult to enforce; and 8) domestic courts may not have the
jurisdiction to hear the case, particularly if the sports governing body
is based in another country.
In any event, to ensure that the hearings at the Games are
processed swiftly and in accordance with the tenets of natural justice,
the authors would concur with Raber87 on certain points, and would
add several additional suggestions for the Ad Hoc Division,
including: 1) publication of CAS decisions; 2) provide for cross
examination of witnesses; 3) ensure a diversity of backgrounds in
arbitrators; 4) allow more liberal discovery; 5) ensure that athletes
are fully informed of their rights and the implications of an
arbitration agreement before signing; and 6) to assist the appeal
process they should ensure the following are ready and easily
accessible for the athletes: a) standard forms; b) a list of scientific
experts; c) a list of lawyers specialising in sports law; d) interpreters;
e) stenotypists; f) legal research resources; and g) appropriate
hearing and meeting rooms.
87

See Nancy K. Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court of Arbitration for
Sport, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 75 (1998).
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Domestic courts may not be willing to challenge CAS decisions
unless there is some issue of procedural fairness or public policy. If
the decision does invoke some question on one of these two issues,
then we can be sure that athletes are no longer afraid of pursuing
court actions and they will do so. As Nafziger stated:
The growth of relatively informal methods for resolving
disputes in the sports arena has coincided with what might
seem to be a contradictory trend, though still weak,
toward adjudication of what formerly were nonjusticiable
controversies. The proliferation of terminal arbitration
clauses and improved methods of nonadjudicatory
resolution of disputes have not inhibited litigation.
Instead, athletes and their clubs have become somewhat
more litigious—perhaps because courts have become
more receptive to claims of due process and human
rights.88
If the arbitration process at the Games is to succeed in warding off
such actions, it must comply with legal norms from outside sport, in
particular the norms of natural justice and human rights.
A further positive development in the Olympic Movement has
been the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (hereinafter
“WADA”).
In its mission statement, WADA promotes the
harmonisation of rules, disciplinary procedures, sanctions and other
means of combating doping in sport.89 The majority of cases heard
before the Ad Hoc Division relate to doping offences, and therefore
the work of WADA is crucial in helping to strengthen the athletes
confidence in the doping process and any subsequent appeal to the
Ad Hoc Division.
For the Sydney Games, WADA created an Office of the
Independent Observer who has since produced a report of its
88

James Nafziger, supra note 7.
See WADA Mission Statement (stating in relevant part, “[t]he mission of the Agency
shall be to promote harmonized rules, disciplinary procedures, sanctions and other means of
combating doping in sport and contribute to the unification thereof taking into account the
rights of athletes.”), available at http://www.wada-ama.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
89
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observations. In relation to the Ad Hoc Division it stated:
The role of the CAS is to ensure that the appropriate
regulations (in this case, those of the IOC and the IFs)
notably those in the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code, have been observed and that the principles of due
process and natural justice have been followed pursuant to
the rules established for CAS. On the basis of the one
hearing that we attended, we are content that the processes
followed in and by the CAS are proper and satisfactory.90
While WADA is also subject to queries regarding its impartiality
and independence, the authors believe that athletes can welcome the
inclusion of this watchdog in the Ad Hoc Division process as a
further indication that the CAS is working towards creating a fair
appeals process that is transparent and entirely independent. It must
continue working toward this aim if it is to successfully and
consistently win the confidence of the athletes it seeks to serve.
Another interesting recent development has been the inclusion of a
CAS mediation process. CAS published its mediation rules in May
1999, but to date has not carried out any sports mediation. Mediation
has the benefit of being an informal, consensual negotiation to try
and reach a settlement. It is usually a quick, cost-effective method
for resolving disputes.91
In the Olympic Games mediation may not be suitable. One
commentator, Christopher Newmark, explains that mediation is
inappropriate in disputes relating to disciplinary or doping
sanctions.92 An athlete should not be free to negotiate a settlement to
avoid sanctions. The CAS mediation rules thus specifically exclude
90

WADA Independent Observer Report, Olympic Games, Sydney, Australia, at
http://www.wada-ama.org (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
91
See Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading With Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 309 n.50 (1999) (citing from Lisa
Brennan, What Lawyers Like: Mediation, NAT’L L.J., Nov.15, 1999, at A1 (noting a recent
NLJ/AAA survey finding that “80% of litigators believe mediation saves time and
money.”)).
92
See Christopher Newmark, Is Mediation Effective for Resolving Sports Disputes?, INT’L
SPORTS L.J. (May 2001).
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disciplinary and doping disputes from the mediation process.93
A further reason why mediation may not work in the Ad Hoc
Division context is the sheer weight of the decisions and their
consequences. Which athlete would willingly enter into negotiations
and then agree to compromise and give up his medal? Or give up his
“chance in a lifetime” to compete in the Olympics? In such
situations, only the formal authority and pronunciation of a court
would be effective.
Newmark goes on to discuss the case of Lewis v. World Boxing
Council (hereinafter “WBC”) and Bruno.94 What is interesting is
that the English courts upheld the WBC’s rules for compulsory
mediation in the U.S. The judge decided this even though the WBC
was one of the parties to the action and, as Lewis pointed out, it
would not be impartial. The Judge was influenced by the fact that
the WBC rules did not deny Lewis access to a court if the mediation
did not resolve the matter.95
The Ad Hoc Division rules and the entry form for athletes try to
prevent court access, and it remains to be seen how the U.S. courts or
the English courts will deal with this if a claim against the Ad Hoc
Division comes before them.
In any event, it seems highly unlikely that a mediation process will
be introduced for the Ad Hoc Division. For the time being,
Olympians have to agree to the compulsory arbitration process of the
Ad Hoc Division, but it may only be a matter of time before the
compelling nature of this process is brought before the courts in a
claim for breach of natural justice and/or breach of human rights.
The next Winter Olympic Games will be held in Salt Lake City,
Utah, U.S., in February 2002. This will be the largest Winter Games
in history, with an estimated 3,500 athletes and officials from eighty
countries expected to attend and participate. Will this be the stage
for a future court action? The U.S. has the reputation of being the
93

For a complete copy of the CAS Mediation Rules, see http://www.tascas.org/english/mediation/fraMediation.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
94
914 F. Supp. 1121 (D.N.J. 1996)
95
See Newmark, supra note 92.
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most litigious country in the world,96 so it is highly probable that if
an athlete were to bring an action for breach of due process or natural
justice, such claim would arise here! Watch this space as the Games
and their aftermath unfold.

96
David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the
United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 29 (1995) (“The rest of the world regards the
United States as the most litigious society ever.”).

